Elliot Regenstein
A neon sign in the window of 7-Van Drugs reads "Food Stamps," but the contradictory truth is posted inside on a handwrit ten sign taped to a thick pane of bulletproof plastic.
7-Van Drugs sits at the intersection of Seven Mile Road and Van Dyke in northern Detroit, where it has "serv[ ed] the community since 1948 at the same corner."1 Inside 7-Van is an array of staple foods and basic household cleaning items, and there is a small phar macy in the back. Customers must use a turnstile to pass their purchases through the bulletproof plastic to the cashier. There are no open windows, which could afford a clean shot. There is, how ever, a small slot to pass money back and forth, and above it is taped a pink piece of paper that says in black magic marker "We don't accept food stamps."
The store was still part of the food stamp program when an un dercover officer from the Michigan State Police walked in on De cember 12, 1994.2 The officer was there to ensure that 7-Van was not illegally trafficking in food stamps. He walked up to two cash registers offering to sell food stamps for cash. Neither cashier took the bait. The officer then left the store but was followed into the parking lot by Saimir Jamel, a seventeen-year-old clerk who is the nephew of the store's co-owners. Jamel, whose duties were limited to sweeping the floor and parking lot and stocking the shelves, of fered to buy the food stamps for cash. He bought $270 in food stamps with $150 of his own money and gave the officer his pager number. He went on to make two more illegal food stamp purchases in January 1995, using his own money in both cases. Af ter the third, the police arrested him in the parking lot outside of 7-Van.
1. The author visited the store September 1, 1997 and May 17, 1998. Seven Mile Road is flanked by a long low line of buildings and is one of the primary commercial thoroughfares in northern Detroit. While a number of the buildings on Seven Mile Road are now abandoned, 7-Va n Drugs currently shares a relatively modern plaza and a small parking lot with a mani curist, an independent insurance agent, and a fashion accessories store.
2. The facts in this paragraph come from Bakal Bros. v. United States, 105 F.3d 1085, 1087 (6th Cir. 1997).
<lure for groceries seeking to benefit from the USDA's discretion. First, the regulations require stores to request a hearing on the civil monetary penalty -and to submit all of the evidence supporting their case -within ten days of receiving a charge letter.12 Second, the evidence submitted may not include evidence about hardship to households that might arise from the store's closure.13 Third, when the civil monetary penalty is applied, the formula for assessing it makes it likely that even small grocery stores will receive the maxi mum penalty.14 Innocent owners have challenged these three provisions through the Food Stamp Act's provision for de novo judicial review,15 and store owners in St. Louis have met with some success. The Eighth Circuit has found that the ten-day limit to request a hearing is arbi trary and capricious,16 that the FCS cannot bar evidence about hardship to households for stores that have committed trafficking violations,17 and that the formula for determining the civil mone tary penalty is also arbitrary and capricious.1 8 Outside of the Eighth Circuit,· however, courts have found the ten-day require ment to be either beyond the scope of judicial review19 or permissi- 12. See 7 C.F.R. § 278.6{b){2){i), (iii ) {1994). 13. See 7 C.F.R. § 278.6(f){l). The regulations make a "hardship-to-households" defense available only for offenses that would otherwise lead to a nonpermanent disqualifi cation, but not for offenses that would otherwise lead to a permanent disqualification. See 7 C.F.R. § 278.6{f){l). When it allows a hardship-to-households defense, the FCS considers whether "the firm's disqualifi cation would cause hardship to food stamp households because there is no other authorized retail food store in the area selling as large a variety of staple food items at comparable prices." 7 C.F.R. § 278.6{f) {l).
14. The formula bases the penalty on the dollar amount of food stamps redeemed by the violating store and dictates that the maximum penalty must be imposed if the trafficking violation exceeds ninety-nine dollars and if the store redeems $40,000 or more in food stamps annually. See 7 C.F.R. § 278.60). This formula effectively applies the maximum fine to al most every store with a meaningful food stamp redemption program. See discussion infra section III.B.
15. Parties aggrieved by FCS decisions are entitled to de novo review in United States district courts or state courts, and the law directs judges to "determine the validity of the questioned administrative action." 7 U.S.C. § 2023{a){l5) {Supp. II 1996 ble;20 they have approved the agency's formula for the civil monetary penalty or found it to be beyond the scope of their re view;21 and they have upheld the FCS's refusal to allow.evidence of hardship to households. 22 This Note argues that courts should adopt the Eighth Circuit's approach in addressing the penalty procedures that follow food stamp trafficking violations. Part I argues that the Food Stamp Act's review provision allows for judicial review of the agency's rules, and that the ten-day response requirement is an arbitrary and capricious standard to which small store owners should not be held. Part II contends that Congress intended to allow stores to present evidence that their permanent disqualification would cause hard ship to households -and that even absent that intent, the agency has no basis for excluding it. Part III asserts that courts that refuse to review the agency's formula for punishing violations misapply Supreme Court doctrine, and that courts reviewing the formula will find it cannot be upheld. This Note concludes that courts should not allow the FCS to require stores to respond to charge letters within ten days, that they should force the FCS to hear stores' evi dence that their permanent disqualification would hurt the sur rounding community, and that they should find the FCS's penalty formula too harsh for small grocery stores.
I. THE TEN-DAY RESPONSE REQUIREMENT
On March 1, 1995, the FCS notified the owners of 7-Van Drugs that the agency was considei.-ing permanently disqualifying their store from the food stamp program.23 The FCS rules allowed the store's owners only ten days to request a civil monetary penalty in lieu of the permanent disqualification; otherwise, they faced an au tomatic permanent disqualification from the program.24 The store's owners did not respond within ten days, and that, according to the Sixth Circuit, required the FCS to disqualify the store perma nently. 25 Section I.A contends that courts can and should review whether the FCS's ten-day response requirement is consistent with Congress's intent in passing the Food Stamp Act. Section I.B fur ther argues that when courts review the requirement they should find it arbitrary and capricious because of the hardship it causes to the owners of small grocery stores, who may not have the resources necessary to prepare the immediate and thorough response that the agency requires.
A. Th e Legitimacy of Judicial Review
Judges should review the legitimacy of the FCS's ten-day re sponse requirement because the Food Stamp Act requires review ing courts to consider the validity of the FCS's rules.26 Courts evaluating the validity of the ten-day response requirement should determine whether the requirement is consistent with both the lan guage of the Food Stamp Act and Congress's intent in passing the Act.27
The Supreme Court requires courts evaluating the "validity" of an agency's actions to consider whether the regulations conform to the language and purpose of the statute.28 If Congress has ex pressed a clear intent as to how an agency should act, the Court requires the agency to act in that manner.29 Lower courts applying this legal standard when considering the validity of a statute gener ally have understood that a regulation's "validity" hinges on its compliance with a statutory scheme.3° Courts should therefore compare the FCS's ten-day response requirement to the statutory scheme to see if the requirement is consistent with Congress's intent.
The Sixth Circuit has not followed the Supreme Court's direc tive.31 Instead of comparing the ten-day requirement to the statu tory scheme to evaluate its validity, the Sixth Circuit has merely ensured that the penalty imposed in each particular case is consis- 28. See K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. , 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) ("In determining whether a challenged regulation is valid a reviewing court must first determine if the regulation is consistent with the language of the statute. . . . In ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the lan guage and design of the statute as a whole. " (citations omitted)). tent with the agency's overall regulatory scheme.32 It refuses to evaluate the regulation itself on the grounds that the Supreme Court prohibits it from interfering in the "shaping" of agency sanc tions. 33 Because stores are foreclosed from a certain kind of sanc tion if they fail to meet the deadline, the Sixth Circuit found that the ten-day requirement affects the severity of the agency's sanc tion, which it sees as shaping the sanction.34
The fundamental problem with this rationale is that the ten-day response requirement is not a sanction. Black's Law Dictionary de fines a sanction as a "penalty imposed."35 The ten-day response requirement is a procedural requirement,36 not a penalty. The agency itself makes this distinction -the ten-day requirement is described in a subsection of the Code of Federal Regulations titled "Charge letter,"37 while the agency's available range of sanctions is discussed separately in a section titled "Penalties. Courts that assess the validity of the ten-day requirement must determine whether the requirement is consistent with Congress's intent and whether it is arbitrary and capricious.4 0 This section ar gues that the FCS's ten-day requirement is contrary to Congress's intent and arbitrary and capricious and should therefore be invali dated. Section I.B.1 argues that the FCS's requirement is inconsis tent with Congress's intent to allow stores access to secretarial discretion. Section I.B.2 shows that the FCS failed to take into ac count the impact of its regulations on small grocery stores and that the regulations impose significant hardships on such stores. Section I.B.3 demonstrates that the FCS has provided an inadequate justifi cation for its rule.
Th e Inconsistency of th e FCS's Rule with Congress's In tent
The ten-day requirement is inconsistent with Congress's intent to allow stores access to secretarial discretion. When Congress modified the Food Stamp Act to allow the FCS discretion in the penalty it administered, it intended to end the "one-strike-and-out" rule then in effect:
The permanent disqualification of retail food stores upon the first trafficking offense ... seems excessively harsh .... [S]tores have been permanently disqualified from participation in the food stamp pro gram .. . for the sale of $6.00 in food stamps for $6.00 in cash .... With Secretarial discretion, we can be assured that the punishment will more closely fit the crime. 4 1 cause access to secretarial discretion is one of the amendment's ex pressly stated purposes, courts assessing the validity of the FCS's ten-day requirement must consider whether the regulation furthers that goal. 43 The requirement makes it difficult for stores, particu larly small stores,44 to access secretarial discretion, putting the rule squarely in conflict with Congress's intent and requiring courts to invalidate it.45 2. Th e Harsh Imp act of the Te n-Day Requirement on Small Grocery Stores
The ten-day response requirement is arbitrary and capricious because the FCS has failed to consider the negative impact its regu lation has on small groceries. The Supreme Court requires courts to find agency rules arbitrary and capricious if the agency making the rule failed to consider some important aspect of the matter the rule addresses.46 Courts therefore must demand that the agency consider all relevant factors of a problem and offer an explanation for its decision.47 Furthermore, courts cannot provide an explana tion for the agency if the agency did not provide one itself.4 8
The FCS has not offered evidence that it considered the impact of the ten-day requirement on small grocery stores.49 In the ab sence of direct evidence that the FCS considered the impact of its rule on small businesses, courts reasonably can infer that the FCS did not consider the negative impact its regulations would have on small groceries, because it would be difficult -if not impossiblefor most small grocery stores to meet the FCS's uncompromising requirements in only ten days .s o The FCS's requirements are harsh: the agency requires stores to provide every piece of documentation relating to the store's train ing program for new employees within ten days; otherwise the agency will permanently disqualify the store from the program. st Many proprietors of small businesses may not understand that they need to provide the necessary documentation, let alone organize it within ten days. In one case, a store owner whose employee had committed a trafficking violation sent a detailed letter begging the FCS for forgiveness, but failed to include the documentation of the store's compliance program.52 When the store owner later found out that the FCS required the documentation, she sent it, but the 50. See Ghattas v. United States, 40 F.3d 281, 285-86 (8th Cir. 1994), quoted infra in text accompanying note 59. The Lopez court vigorously disagreed with Ghattas's attack on the ten-day requirement, saying:
While it might be convenient for an owner busy running a store to have more than ten days, there is nothing in the nature of drafting or copying such documents that makes a ten day limit inherently unreasonable, nor therefore the imposition of that limit "a clear error of judgment." If the regulation allowed only one day, presuming that all the re quired documentation would be extant and available for immediate mailing, then one could conclude that the agency had "e ntirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem."
Lopez, 962 F. Supp. at 1231 (citation omitted). By admitting that one day is not enough, the Lopez court engages in the same exercise as the Ghattas court: considering how many days in which a store could reasonably be expected to respond to an FCS notice. Careful consid eration would require evidence of the business circumstances of small grocery stores, to see if they could reasonably be expected to meet a ten-day deadline. While the Lopez opinion cites portions of the Ghattas opinion explaining the hardship the requirement causes to own ers of small groceries, the Lopez court apparently was not convinced that a small grocery store would need more than ten days to find an attorney who could then organize the exten sive documentation required by the FCS.
51. See 7 C.F.R. § 278.6(b )(2)(iii) (1994) ("If a firm fails to request consideration for a civil money penalty in lieu of a permanent disqualification for trafficking and submit docu mentation and evidence of its eligibility within the 10 days specified in § 278. In response to the allegations, Guadalupe Lopez, Alonzo's mother, wrote to the FCS admitting the store's guilt eight days after receiving the charge. She admitted that their son had not been properly trained before working at the store while on a break from school. (Any store that requests a civil monetary penalty must have an adequate training program for its employees to be considered, see 7 U.S.C. § 2021(b )(3)(B) (Supp. II 1996), but the FCS apparently did not reach the issue of the store's training program). The owners said that they had explained the rules to their employees again, and were translating them into Spanish to ensure that all of them understood; they did not, however, provide any documentary evi dence of these programs. The letter closed with Ms. Lopez begging for forgiveness, and asking if the case could be re-evaluated. See Lopez, 962 F. Supp. at 1227-28.
The FCS did not consider Ms. Lopez's letter a timely request for a civil monetary penalty.
See Lopez, 962 F. Supp. at 1228.
FCS refused to hear her appeal because she had missed the dead line.s3 If the FCS showed more sympathy to ownerss4 and allowed some flexibility in the ten-day limit for owners making a good-faith effort to comply with the FCS's investigation,55 the FCS's rule would be more reasonable and less capricious.
Furthermore, ten days is too short a time for the owner of a small grocery store to find counsel to help in these matters.5 6 In other adversarial proceedings, parties are given more time to gather less material than innocent owners are expected to gather to re quest an FCS hearing.57 Having counsel certainly could give the store a better chance in the diffi cult FCS administrative review pro cess.58 While an attorney presumably could organize the documen tation in the time required, as the Eighth Circuit found, the rule The Eighth Circuit also noted that the ten-day requirement is "far shorter than the time for filing a one-paragraph notice of appeal to this court." See Ghattas, 40 F.3d at 285. Perhaps the general counsel of a supermarket chain could comply with this command . . . . We have little doubt that most sole proprie tors of small grocery stores would find it virtually impossible to locate and hire an attorney who could master this area of the law and gather and file the necessary materials in ten days. Once again, the [FCS] regulations dramatically skew the administrative process to the disad vantage of small business.59
For the most part, the businesses that have proceeded against the FCS pro se have been unsuccessful.6 0 The FCS's rule dispropor tionately harms small businesses, suggesting that the agency did not consider its impact when promulgating the regulation and making the regulation arbitrary and capricious.
Th e FCS's In ability to Justify Its Requirement
When forced to defend its regulations in court, the FCS has failed to offer direct evidence in support of its regulations. Instead, it has relied on analogies, and the analogies it has used are inappro priate. While the FCS correctly claims that some other agencies do require responses to charge letters within ten days,61 those other agencies may do so in order to comply with statutorily imposed deadlines. In those situations, allowing more than ten days for a response would compromise the agencies' ability to fulfill their stat- utorily imposed duties.62 The FCS has no similar statutory require ment to justify its position, making its analogy inadequate.63
Assuming arguendo that the FCS did take into account the im pact on small businesses, the regulations only seem more in conflict with Congress's intent. In this scenario, the FCS would seem to want to harm small businesses, which are less able to meet a strict requirement than large supermarkets.64 By creating this obstacle, the requirement institutes a de facto one-strike-and-out policy for small groceries. That, however, would create an explicit conflict with Congress's intent to end the one-strike-and-out practice that automatically disqualifies groceries after one traffi cking offense by a store's employees.6s
There are legitimate policy reasons underlying the FCS's reluc tance to make it easier for the owners of small grocery stores to request a hearing to appeal their disqualifications. Small grocery stores have been hotbeds of corruption in the food stamp pro gram, 66 particularly in poor neighborhoods.67 Most of the stores participating in the food stamp program are small and indepen dently owned; while supermarkets redeem 77% of all food stamps, The Department also justifi es its narrow window by saying that it is "simply requesting copies of policies and documentation of compliance program activities already in existence. "
See id. The fact that the FCS requires small stores to keep extensive written records has also come under criticism, and the FCS has responded that the standards are the same for both small and large stores. See id. at 31,810. While stores are required to keep these records on an ongoing basis, they may not understand how to use the information in a response to an Despite the role of small stores in food stamp trafficking, the FCS cannot justify its ten-day requirement, because it does not con form with the Food Stamp Act's statutory scheme. When Congress amended the statute it was aware that trafficking was a problem, but it still demanded that store owners be given access to secretarial discretion.72 Congress provided for secretarial discretion because some store's manager' fight corruption and Congress felt that those owners should not receive the same punishment as owners who made no effort�73 The FCS should therefore protect innocent own ers' ability to defend themselves. Owners who are in fact guilty will still face permanent disqualification after the hearing. For that rea son, making it easier for store owners to receive a hearing would not necessarily allow corrupt owners to stay in the program.74
Courts should not allow the FCS to enforce its ten-day response requirement strictly. The rule denies small stores access to the pro- tection Congress intended for them to have, and does not even as sist the FCS in its efforts to root out illegal food stamp trafficking. The requirement has no good justification, and courts should there fore prevent the agency from applying it.
II. EVIDENCE OF lMPACT ON
In evaluating the agency's regulation that prevents innocent owners from presenting hardship-to-households evidence,76 courts should consider whether the agency's rule is consistent with Con gress's intent by applying the two-step Chevron test.77 Under Chev ron, the court must first decide if Congress had an unambiguous intent that hardship-to-households evidence be either included or excluded.78 If Congress's intent is unambiguous, the court must force the FCS to comply with Congress's intent.79 If, however, Congress's intent is ambiguous, the court must then decide whether the agency's regulation is a reasonable construction of the statute. 80 Section II.A shows that Congress unambiguously intended to re quire the FCS to permit hardship-to-households evidence in inno cent-owner cases. Section II.B argues that even if Congress's intent 75. The FCS sometimes mitigates penalties because "the firm subject to a disqualification is selling a substantial variety of staple food items, and the firm's disqualification would cause hardship to food stamp households because there is no other authorized retail food store in the area selling as large a variety of staple food items at comparable prices. " See 7 C.F.R. § 278.6(f)(l) (1994). Such evidence is not allowed, however, in cases in which the firm is facing a permanent disqualification, such as in innocent-owner cases. See 7 C.F.R. § 278.6(i).
This section criticizes that distinction as contrary to Congress's intent and as arbitrary and capricious.
In the particular case of 7-Van Drugs, it is possible the store's hardship-to-households evidence might not have been compelling because of the presence of competitors within walking distance. This section argues that Congress, when amending the Fo od Stamp Act, intended to compel the FCS to consider evidence of hardship to food stamp households in innocent-owner cases. Sec tion II.A.1 demonstrates that the plain language of the statute sup ports this conclusion. Section II.A.2 shows how this interpretation is consistent with the legislative history of the Fo od Stamp Act amendments.
Th e Plain Language of the Statute
The Fo od Stamp Act directs the FCS to consider evidence of hardship to households when deciding whether to disqualify viola tors of the act or to assess them a monetary penalty. The language mandating the consideration of hardship-to-households evidence appears in the statute's introductory paragraph subsection (a) ("the introduction"). It provides, in relevant part: The FCS's present rule makes sense only if the innocent-owner penalty clause does not incorporate the hardship-to-households de fense by reference. The FCS claims that the different maximum civil monetary penalty in the innocent-owner penalty clause85 makes that clause "mutually exclusive" of the introduction, so the hardship-to-households defense in the introduction does not apply to cases decided under the innocent-owner penalty clause.86 The Supreme Court has held that if one section of a statute includes particular language, and another section of the same statute does not, it should be presumed that Congress intentionally excluded the language in the section that does not include it.87
Where specifi.c language of the innocent-owner penalty clause disagrees with the introduction, the specifi.c language must trump the general. But the innocent-owner penalty clause's incorporation of the introduction is not destroyed. Here, the difference in the maximum penalties does not matter, because the remainder of the introduction's language is still incorporated by reference into the specifi.c penalty clauses,88 and the innocent-owner penalty clause describes a specifi.c subset of the violations described broadly in the introduction.89 Because the specifi.c language controls the gen- Furthermore, the FCS's regulation is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute because it distinguishes between types of offending stores in ways that the statute itself does not. The Food Stamp Act discusses instances when a hardship-to-households de fense will make a civil monetary penalty available in lieu of disqual ifi.cation, and the Act never says that the civil penalty will be available only if the store's disqualifi.cation would have been tem porary and not permanent.93 The FCS, however, allows evidence of hardship to households only when the store's maximum penalty is a temporary disqualifi.cation.94 Because this FCS regulation is incon sistent with the plain meaning of the statute, courts "must give ef fect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress"95 and find the agency's regulation unlawful. The FCS's distinction "deprives food stamp beneficiaries of a statutory exception enacted for their benefit. "96 Conn. 1997) (ruling on plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction) ("[T]he statute does not limit the 'hardship to households' exception to non-permanent disqualifi cation, but rather provides generally that any disquali fication may be replaced by a money penalty.").
94. See 7 C.F.R. § 278.6(f)(l) ("A civil money penalty for hardship to food stamp house holds may not be imposed in lieu of a permanent disqualifi cation." (emphasis added)). 
Th e Legislative Purpose
The FCS's refusal to hear hardship-to-household defenses in in nocent-owner cases is also inconsistent with Congress's intent in passing the Fo od Stamp Act and its amendments. Congress passed the Fo od Stamp Act with the stated intention of providing healthy food to people who might not otherwise be able to afford it.97 The Supreme Court found in Un ited States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno that providing low-income households with healthier foods is the primary purpose of the Act.98 "While the Act's language has changed over the years, this fundamental purpose remains un changed.99 The FCS's refusal to hear hardship-to-households evi dence in innocent-owner cases is inconsistent with Congress's purpose to provide healthier food for poorer families.100 Adminis trative disregard for hard-hit households punishes the intended beneficiaries of the Act, rather than protecting them.
The 1988 amendments to the Fo od Stamp Act made substantial changes to the penalties imposed on innocent owners, but the amendments' legislative history makes no mention of whether a hardship-to-households defense should be denied to innocent own ers.101 The legislative history focuses solely on narrow, technical changes made in subsection (b )10 2 and does not address the part of the statute that remained the same: the incorporation by reference promote the general welfare, that the Nation's abundance of food should be utilized coopera tively ... to the maximum extent practicable to safeguard the health and well-being of the Nation's population and raise levels of nutrition among low-income households.").
98. 413 U.S. 528, 533-34 (1973 102. See id. (discussing the kinds of policies and programs that would allow the Depart ment of Agriculture to conclude that a store's management had trained employees to know which food stamp transactions were legal and which were illegal, and to further conclude that management had actively discouraged employees from participating in illegal transactions).
of the hardship-to-households defense in subsection (a) to subsec tion (b).103 That the incorporation by reference remained un changed in the amended statute suggests that Congress expected it to remain in force.104
Courts should find that the FCS is required to consider hard ship-to-households evidence, based on the plain language of the statute and Congress's legislative intent. They should find that the FCS was mistaken when it severed the innocent-owner penalty clause from the introduction and drew distinctions between stores in a way Congress did not authorize. They should also find that the agency's action is inconsistent with Congress's policy of providing quality food to impoverished households and its expectation that hardship-to-households evidence will be available to innocent own ers defending themselves. If, however, a court finds that Congress's intent on this matter was ambiguous, it must proceed to consider whether the agency's rule is arbitrary and capricious under the sec ond step of Chevron .1 os
B. Th e FCS's Decision to Exclude Hardship-to-Households Evidence Is Arbitrary and Capricious Un der the Second
Step of Chevron This section argues that even if Congress's intent in the statu tory scheme were ambiguous, the FCS 's exclusion of hardship-to households evidence should be found arbitrary and capricious under the second step of the Chevron test.106 Section II.B.1 finds that the FCS failed to explain this exclusion, making it difficult for a court to sustain the FCS's regulation. Section II.B.2 argues that the FCS could not reasonably decide to exclude hardship-to-house holds evidence.
Th e FCS's Fa ilure to Exp lain Its Actions
The FCS's decision to exclude hardship-to-households evidence is arbitrary and capricious because the FCS has failed to explain the 104. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 567 (1988) ("Quite obviously, reenacting precisely the same language is a strange way to make a change.").
105. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 {1984). If the court finds that Congress's clear intent was to exclude hardship-to-households evidence, it must uphold the FCS's regulation without reaching step two of Chevron. 467 U.S. at 842-43.
106. As noted above, both circuits to consider this issue have found Congress's intent to be unambiguous, and did not reach the issue of whether the FCS's action was arbitrary and capricious. See Kim v. United States, 121 F.3d 1269, 1276 {9th Cir. 1997); Ghattas v. United States, 40 F.3d 281, 285 (8th Cir. 1994). Because these courts disagreed about what Con gress's "unambiguous" mandate was, it is possible that future courts will find Congress's mandate ambiguous, and reach the second step of the Chevron test.
reasons behind the exclusion and has failed to consider compelling evidence that permanent disqualification harms the intended bene ficiaries of the food stamp program. The Supreme Court requires agencies to explain the rationale behind their rules.107 When the FCS promulgated its regulations, it did not discuss the reasons be hind its decision to exclude the hardship-to-households defense in innocent-owner cases.108 A court could legitimately find the rule arbitrary and capricious based solely on the agency's failure to ex plain the evidence and rationale supporting its action.109
Th e Evidence of the Need fo r a Hardship-to-Households Defense
A court could uphold the regulation at the second step of the Chevron test despite the agency's lack of explanation if the rule is a rational one based on the available evidence.110 In this case the agency has provided no evidence to consider.111 Much of the evi dence that exists suggests that the agency's decision to exclude hardship-to-households evidence cannot reasonably be reconciled with the Fo od Stamp Act's general purpose, providing healthier food to people who otherwise might not be able to afford it,112 and the rule is therefore arbitrary and capricious under the second step of the Chevron test.
There is strong evidence that food stamp households may expe rience hardship when stores are permanently disqualified.113 De spite the positive impact of the Fo od Stamp Act, it has become increasingly difficult for lower-income households in the inner city 108. See Fo od Stamp Program; Civil Money Penalties in Lieu of Permanent Disqualifica tion for Trafficking, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,809 (1990) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 278) (including no discussion of hardship-to-households evidence). This is analogous to the agency's failure to provide an explanation of its ten-day response requirement. See discussion supra Part LB.
109. See State Fa rm, 463 U.S. at 43. 110. See State Fa rm, 463 U.S. at 43 (explaining that an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency based its decision on the wrong factors, or offered an explanation that was counter to the evidence).
111. See supra text accompanying note 108. 112. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text. 113. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 99, at Bl ("Most of the stores eliminated from the program were in the county's poor urban areas where the need is greatest . . . ."). The hardship may extend beyond food stamp households; a permanent disqualifi cation from the food stamp program could drive some stores out of business, forcing all consumers to travel farther to purchase groceries. See Cross v. United States, 512 F.2d 1212, 1217 (4th Cir. 1975) (en bane) ("[D]isqualification may have grave economic consequences to a retailer engaged in business in a depressed economic area where there is widespread use of food stamps. In such an area one who holds himself out as a retailer of food would be cut off from a substan tial segment of the buying public if he is disqualified from engaging in food stamp transactions.").
to benefit from the program. Poorer neighborhoods are less likely than wealthier neighborhoods to have full-service supermarkets, which are located primarily in the suburbs.114 Instead, poor neigh borhoods are more likely to have small convenience stores that pro vide food that is often less nutritious and higher priced than the food at grocery stores.115 The urban grocery stores that do remain in the inner city may do a high percentage of their business in food stamps, meaning that a permanent disqualification from the pro- 115. The FCS's data support the proposition that small grocery stores are more expensive than supermarkets. At supermarkets in high-poverty urban areas, the cost of the FCS's mar ket basket is 102% the cost of the same market basket at an average supermarket. See CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 114, at 22 & tbl.9. At small grocery stores, the price jumps to 141 % of the cost at an average supermarket. See id.; see also Boisseau, supra note 114, at 2C ("[P]oor families [are forced] to shop at small grocery and convenience stores where they pay higher prices for less-nutritious food."); Okeson, supra note 114, at Bl ("[Velmon Cleveland] refuses to shop at the nearby Downtown 66 gas station, where Inilk is $2.79 a gallon and eggs are $1.79 a dozen, a third higher than to almost double the prices at a discount grocery store.").
The poor nutritional value of convenience store food is so widely accepted that it has even become a subject for satire: "I suddenly realized that I was trapped in the [Kwik-E-Mart] with ..• no food!" "But Uncle Apu, what about the heat lamp dogs and nacho chips with synthetic cheese covering?" "Tsk, tsk. How soon you seem to be forgetting lesson 12 -'Food from Kwik-E can make you sicky. "' Matt Groening, Apu Nahasapeemapetilon's Kwik-E·Comics, in SIMPSONS COMICS: STRIKE BACK! 61, 65 (1996) .
At urban supermarkets, the situation is somewhat better. The FCS notes that "[a]Ithough the cost, availability, and quality of food do not vary between urban supermarkets in high poverty and other areas, the total shopping experience does. Supermarkets in high-poverty urban areas offer substantially fewer full-service departments and non-food product lines than supermarkets in other areas." CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 114, at 25.
gram could have a crippling effect on stores,116 potentially reducing service to already underserved food stamp households.
The fact that food stamp households may suffer when retailers are disqualified suggests that the FCS did not consider the potential hardship to food stamp households when it carved out an exception to the usual rule permitting hardship-to-households evidence. Any "permissible construction of the statute"117 must take into account the impact on food stamp program participants.118 Because inner city neighborhoods are already underserved by grocery stores, the FCS's harsh actions may serve to widen the "grocery gap."119 The FCS's regulation means that even if a store is the sole provider of healthy, inexpensive food in a poor urban120 neighborhood, an in nocent-owner violation could force neighborhood food stamp users to go to convenience stores where they would pay more for food with less nutritional value.121 Courts should find that to be an un reasonable construction of the statutory goal of "raising levels of nutrition among low-income households."122 Innocent owners should be allowed to present evidence that their store's closure will harm food stamp households. If the store facing disqualification is the best store in a poor neighborhood or the only store easily accessed in a particular neighborhood, the store's closure could have a negative impact on food stamp house- The majority of trafficking offenses are taking place at small stores, which do not always provide the high-quality food that people in poor neighborhoods need. See THE EXTENT OF TRAFFI CKING, supra note 66, at 4. Tr afficking is higher at all stores in poor neighborhoods, however, see id., and the hardship-to-households evidence exclusion applies to all stores, even those that do provide high quality food and service, see 7 C.F.R. § 278.6(f) (l) (1994 Regardless of which penalty they received at the hearing, the owners of 7-Van could have then challenged the penalty in court under the Food Stamp Act's de novo review provision. While some courts would have heard 7-Van's case, some courts have refused to review the agency's sanction. Section III.A argues that the courts' de novo review should include the agency's sanction.1zs Section III.B criticizes the FCS's penalty formula as arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to the purposes of the statute. presented.' They mean to us that the court shonld make an independent determination of the issues.''). States, 459 F.2d 300, 302 (6th Cir. 1972) (Edwards, J., dissenting) ("My brothers construe the language which follows 'trial de novo by the court' as a limitation upon that term. On its face, however, the phrase 'in which the court shall determine the validity of the questioned administrative action in issue' describes but does not limit.''); see also The FCS's penalty formula is ill-suited for innocent-owner cases. The penalty formula is based solely on a retailer's honest food stamps redemptions, and thus punishes an innocent owner for doing good business.145 Even under an arbitrary and capricious standard, this formula hardly seems to make "the punishment . . . more closely fit the crime" as the legislative history to the amendments suggests it should.14 6
The FCS's penalty provision fails to make meaningful distinc tions based on the seriousness of the crime and the effect the fine will have on the store. The FCS has defended its formula by saying that it "appropriately recognizes variations based upon the severity of the trafficking offense."147 In the case of first-time offenders, riod of disqualification imposed would itself be subject to judicial review as several courts have held that it is .
•.• The trial de nova ... should be limited to the determination of the validity of the administrative action, but not of the severity of the sanction." (citations omitted)).
142. "recognizing variations" means simply that the fine is doubled if the traffi cking offense involved more than $99 in food stamps. 148 Other than doubling the fine if the offense was for $99 or more, the only variable in the penalty formula is how much food stamp business a store transacts, a variable that the agency puts through a series of multipliers to determine the penalty.149
In practice, the multistep formula promulgated by the FCS al ways leads to the same simple conclusion: the fine for a store's first violation is exactly half of the store's annual food stamp redemp tions for violations involving $99 or less in food stamps, and is ex actly the store's annual food stamp redemptions for violations of $100 or more in food stamps. 150 The fine for the second violation is twice that.151 Because the maximum penalty is $20,000 for each vi olation, with no more than a $40,000 penalty for each investiga tion,15 2 the formula dictates that any store that redeems more than $40,000 in food stamps in a given calendar year will receive the maximum penalty for any employee-trafficking violation.153
Many stores with food stamp redemption programs do, in fact, redeem much more than $40,000 a year in food stamps. 154 The formula guarantees that all of these stores will receive the maxi mum possible fine, without recognizing any variation in the severity of the offense.155 The maximum penalty is also the probable sanc tion for stores with annual redemptions between $20,000 and $40,000, because the higher penalty applies for any violation involv ing more than $100. Many trafficking offenses involve more than $100 in food stamps.156 E ven small-time operators routinely con duct illegal food stamp trafficking violations over $100.157 Because the threshold is so low, the maximum penalty will be assessed to stores with annual food stamp redemptions of $20,000 or more . 15 8 The fine can cripple small inner-city stores with low profit mar gins.159 This is particularly harsh because the owner of the store has not benefited from the illegal transaction. 160 The FCS has the flexibility to improve the formula by adding new criteria.161 Because the statute does not explicitly enumerate criteria for consideration in the formula, the FCS could incorporate, for example, the criteria for criminal fines.162 These criteria could include, as they do now, the store's income and financial re sources. 163 The formula could also distinguish between large and small stores and consider whether the store has taken any action against the employee(s) involved in the illegal traf:ficking;164 and it could consider whether the fine will cause other people, such as food stamp consumers, to suffer any :financial loss.165 Courts should find the current formula arbitrary and capricious because it allows the agency to administer the maximum fine in too many cases; the FCS should be forced to develop a formula that meets the statutory goal of making the fine appropriate for the particular violation.
C ONCLUSION
The FCS has consistently misinterpreted the Food Stamp Act's purpose in promulgating regulations relating to innocent-owner vi olations. It has erected procedural hurdles that prevent innocent owners from accessing statutory procedures designed for their ben efit, it prevents them from presenting compelling evidence that their punishment should be mitigated, and it applies a penalty formula that imposes the maximum penalty for even minor offenses in small stores. The cumulative effect of its regulations is to harm small stores, and to reduce the Food Stamp Program's impact on the poor communities that need its help the most.
In the case of 7-Van Drugs, the opportunity to present evidence on its own behalf might have allowed the store to keep its food stamp privileges -at some cost, but perhaps not an unreasonable one. Instead, a teenaged clerk's personal greed has forced the store from the food stamp program. Even the court that upheld the FCS's sanction was concerned that the result it reached might be unjust.166 While that court agreed with the FCS's misinterpretation of the Food Stamp Act, future courts reviewing FCS actions under the Food Stamp Act's de novo review provision should force the FCS to comply with Congress's statutory scheme and stop the FCS from trampling on the rights of small grocery store owners in poor neighborhoods. 
